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N.C. L. REV. 847 (2021) 
Is the Cherry Sour? Why Doctrinal Borrowing Has Caused the Cherry 
Doctrine To Converge with RICO Law* 
Since Pinkerton, criminal law has long accepted the proposition that all parties 
to a conspiracy are criminally liable for the acts of another conspirator so long as 
those acts were reasonably foreseeable, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and 
within the scope of the conspiracy. This proposition intersects with the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in interesting—and constitutionally-suspect—ways, 
particularly when considering the hearsay exceptions. The Tenth Circuit in 
United States v. Cherry applied this coconspirator liability to the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine under FRE 804(b)(6) such that a conspirator who 
unlawfully renders a witness unavailable for trial foregoes not only the hearsay 
objection but also the constitutional right of all coconspirators to confront adverse 
witnesses regarding that witness’s out-of-court statement.  
Within the limited scope of Pinkerton liability, this is intuitive. However, does 
the logic apply when the conspiracy is alleged to have occurred under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”)? It should not, 
but following the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. 
Adoma, the die has been cast to circumvent the rights of defendants because of 
the acts of their coconspirators even when those acts were not foreseeable, in 
furtherance, or within the scope of the conspiracy.  
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that Jack has joined the Reds Nation,1 one of our country’s most 
notorious organized drug gangs. Jack, along with a small group, conspires to rob 
a local laundromat owned by Bob. But, unbeknownst to the coconspirators, Bob 
has equipped his business with security cameras that capture the entire crime. 
After the robbery, Bob gives the recording to the police and intends to testify 
against the coconspirators. The coconspirators, but not Jack, find out about the 
recording and Bob’s plan to testify. They murder Bob to prevent him from 
testifying at trial. Jack, however, neither had actual knowledge of the plan nor 
did he participate in any aspect of the murder. Nonetheless, the prosecution 
 
 *  © 2021 Dale A. Davis. 
 1. This Recent Development explores the issues arising when the crimes of one gang 
member  implicate another gang member due to conspiracy liability. See infra Parts II–III. To 
demonstrate these issues, I have constructed an example using an invented gang. For more information 
on crime statistics, see National Youth Gang Survey Analysis: Gang-Related Offenses, NAT’L GANG CTR., 
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/survey-analysis/gang-related-offenses [https://perma.cc/2C7U-
SE44]. 
N.C. L. REV. 847 (2021) 
848 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
successfully enters Bob’s proposed testimony into evidence against both the 
coconspirators and Jack. Because of the Tenth Circuit’s holding in United States 
v. Cherry,2 when Jack’s coconspirators murdered Bob, they forfeited not only 
their own Confrontation Clause rights and hearsay protections, but also Jack’s.3 
In other words, the Cherry court held that the criminal acts of a defendant’s 
coconspirators may forfeit the Confrontation Clause rights and hearsay 
protections of both the defendant and their coconspirators.4 
In the prosecution of organized drug trafficking crimes, the above scenario 
demonstrates the frequent loss of constitutional protections for criminal 
defendants. Together, the forfeiture of the right to confrontation guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment,5 exceptions to hearsay statements under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), and liability as a coconspirator established by 
Pinkerton v. United States 6  all coincided to the detriment of the criminal 
defendant in Cherry. 7  Under the common law forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine, a criminal defendant forfeits their right to confront an adverse 
witness—the right afforded to them by the Confrontation Clause—when they 
wrongfully render that witness unavailable for trial. 8 But under the federal 
codification of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in FRE 804(b)(6) (“FBW 
hearsay exception”), a defendant may also forfeit their right to a hearsay 
objection at trial for the same action.9 Therefore, a defendant who wrongfully 
renders an adverse witness unavailable for trial may forfeit their hearsay 
objection to the proposed testimony, their right to confront that adverse 
witness, or both. 
But the FRE also exclude the statements of a defendant from the rule 
against hearsay.10 Put simply, a defendant’s own statements may be entered into 
 
 2. 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 3. This scenario is loosely based on United States v. Adoma, 781 F. App’x 199 (4th Cir. 2019), 
where the Fourth Circuit considered similar facts. Id. at 202–04. 
 4. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
 6. 328 U.S. 640 (1946). For an explanation of Pinkerton coconspirator liability, see infra Section 
I.A. The three Pinkerton prongs require a crime to be committed (1) in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
(2) within the scope of the conspiracy, and (3) reasonably foreseeable to the coconspirators. Id. at 646–
48. 
 7. See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. 
 8. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), the Supreme Court first recognized the 
common law forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. Id. at 158. 
 9. Congress codified the Reynolds rule in FRE 804(b)(6), which provides a lawful exception to 
hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 10. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Under the hearsay rules, the term “exclusion” is distinct from 
“exception.” Certain types of statements are “excluded” from the hearsay rule as a necessary “result of 
the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule.” FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. An “exception,” on the other hand, signifies 
the “nonapplication of the hearsay rule, rather than [a] positive term[] of admissibility.” FED. R. EVID. 
803 advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. 
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evidence and used against them. And under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) (“the 
coconspirator party opponent rule”), this exclusion is expanded to include the 
statements that one coconspirator makes to another coconspirator when those 
statements are offered into evidence against the defendant, even if the 
defendant was not actually part of the conversation.11 The prosecutor may offer 
a coconspirator’s statement into evidence against the defendant so long as it was 
made “during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”12 These criteria ensure that 
any proffered statement actually reflects a defendant’s real involvement in the 
alleged criminal activity. 
The rule established in Cherry may be read as a logical extension, then, of 
the coconspirator party opponent rule. In Cherry, the Tenth Circuit held that 
the FBW hearsay exception incorporates Pinkerton coconspirator liability such 
that a defendant forfeits their hearsay objection to an unavailable witness’s 
proffered testimony when a coconspirator wrongfully renders that potential 
witness unavailable for trial.13 The Cherry doctrine holds, therefore, that (1) 
under the coconspirator party opponent rule, the coconspirator’s hearsay 
statement is admissible against the defendant; (2) under FRE 804(b)(6), the 
hearsay statement by a witness rendered unavailable by the defendant is 
admissible against the defendant; and (3) the hearsay statement made by a 
witness rendered unavailable by the defendant’s coconspirator is admissible 
against the defendant.14 
However, the Cherry doctrine is anything but a logical extension of the 
coconspirator party opponent rule: it conflates the gravity of an evidentiary rule 
governed by the FRE with that of a constitutional protection governed by the 
Sixth Amendment. Each of the three rules comprising the Cherry doctrine—
forfeiture of Confrontation Clause rights, forfeiture of the hearsay objection, 
and admission of a party’s own statement—requires a preliminary 
determination of fact governed by FRE 104(a).15 To admit evidence supporting 
the forfeiture of confrontation rights or the hearsay objection, the proponent of 
the evidence must prove before the judge, by a preponderance of the evidence 
per FRE 104, that the defendant intended that their own action produce the 
witness’s unavailability. 16  Similarly, the proponent of a coconspirator’s 
 
 11. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 12. Id. 
 13. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 821 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 14. Id. at 820 (“We therefore hold that a co-conspirator may be deemed to have ‘acquiesced in’ 
the wrongful procurement of a witness’s unavailability for purposes of Rule 804(b)(6) and the 
[forfeiture] by misconduct doctrine when the government can satisfy the requirements of Pinkerton.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 15. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether . . . 
evidence is admissible.”). 
 16. See FED. R. EVID. 104; FED R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note on rules—1997 
amendment; infra Section I.C. 
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statement offered against the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence per FRE 104(b), that a conspiracy indeed existed between each of 
these coconspirators.17 Where each of these determinations previously required 
separate procedural hearings, the Cherry doctrine allows a court to determine 
merely by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has forfeited their 
own Confrontation Clause rights when their coconspirator wrongfully renders a 
potential witness unavailable for trial. The Supreme Court has nonetheless 
accepted the Cherry doctrine’s validity, albeit tacitly, by refusing to grant 
certiorari in subsequent Cherry doctrine cases.18 
Then, in the unpublished decision United States v. Adoma,19 the Fourth 
Circuit expanded Cherry by applying it to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act20 (“RICO”) conspiracy charges.21 While the Cherry doctrine 
applied explicitly to a Pinkerton conspiracy, Adoma expanded the Cherry doctrine 
by finding that the less demanding elements of a RICO conspiracy satisfied the 
coconspirator liability necessary to forfeit a defendant’s confrontation rights—
that is, the right to cross-examine or otherwise interrogate an adverse witness’s 
statement.22 This Recent Development, therefore, argues not that Cherry itself 
was wrongly decided,23 but that expanding the Cherry doctrine through Adoma 
impermissibly dilutes the FBW hearsay exception by untethering it from both 
its FRE 801(d)(2)(E) counterpart and the Advisory Committee on Evidence 
Rules’ (“Committee” or “Advisory Committee”) rationale for FRE 
801(d)(2)(E).24 
 
 17. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (“The statement must be considered but does not by itself establish 
the . . . existence of the conspiracy or participation in it . . . .”); see Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 
171, 175–76 (1987) (“There must be evidence that there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and 
the nonoffering party, and that the statement was made ‘during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.’ . . . [T]he existence of a conspiracy and [defendant’s] involvement in it are preliminary 
questions of fact that, under Rule 104, must be resolved by the court. . . . [W]hen the preliminary facts 
relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are disputed, the offering party must prove them by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”). 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 965 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e follow the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Cherry and hold that the waiver-by-misconduct of one conspirator may be 
imputed to another conspirator.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1134 (2003); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 
336, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding Cherry in the D.C. Circuit), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1246 (2007). 
Although I disagree with the Cherry doctrine’s central premise that a criminal actor may forfeit their 
Confrontation Clause rights through the acts of their coconspirator, I grant that the Cherry doctrine 
(for now) is the current law for purposes of this Recent Development. 
 19. 781 F. App’x 199 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 20. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968). 
 21. Adoma, 781 F. App’x at 203–04. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Although I believe that the Cherry doctrine wrongly forfeits the constitutional right of a 
defendant to confront the witnesses against them, the Supreme Court has indicated its unwillingness 
to decide the issue by denying certiorari in cases where courts have adopted the Cherry doctrine. See 
supra note 18 and accompanying text. So instead, this Recent Development focuses on the appropriate 
standard by which to determine Confrontation Clause forfeiture. 
 24. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. 
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This Recent Development proceeds in four parts. First, it compares the 
Advisory Committee’s rationale in creating the coconspirator party opponent 
rule with both the rationale justifying the FBW hearsay exception and the 
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Cherry. Next, this Recent Development explains 
how the Cherry court used an agency theory of waiver to circumvent the 
Confrontation Clause issue that arises when the coconspirator party opponent 
rule is applied to Pinkerton cases. This Recent Development then explores the 
Adoma decision and explains why applying Cherry to RICO charges 
unjustifiably expands the Cherry doctrine at the expense of our criminal justice 
system’s procedural and evidentiary protections. Finally, this Recent 
Development argues that what Professor Jennifer Laurin terms “doctrinal 
borrowing”25 facilitated the incorporation of RICO conspiracy liability into the 
FBW hearsay exception. But this borrowing ultimately untethered the 
protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause from the FBW hearsay 
exception’s rationale that one should not benefit from their own criminal 
wrongdoing. 
Instead of further expanding the Cherry doctrine as the Fourth Circuit did 
in Adoma, this Recent Development argues in Part IV that the Cherry doctrine 
should be limited by using a just and fair standard to apply the FBW hearsay 
exception. Whereas courts currently determine by a preponderance of the 
evidence the admissibility of evidence purporting to show a conspiracy or 
wrongdoing intended to prevent a witness’s testimony, courts should instead 
adopt a clear and convincing standard by which to judge such evidence. 
I.  THE ROOTS OF THE CHERRY TREE: PINKERTON, THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF EVIDENCE, AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
First, it is important to disentangle the parts comprising the Cherry 
doctrine. The Cherry doctrine extends the coconspirator party opponent rule by 
attaching it to the FBW hearsay exception. But to understand how and why, it 
is necessary to explain the bounds of Pinkerton coconspirator liability, the 
hearsay rules and exceptions, the rationale of the Advisory Committee in 
adopting the relevant rules, and the Confrontation Clause itself. 
A. Pinkerton Coconspirator Liability 
The first prong of the Cherry doctrine is derived from Pinkerton, which 
serves as the basis for common law conspiracy liability.26 Under Pinkerton, a 
 
 25. See generally Jennifer Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011) (discussing the doctrinal borrowing of qualified immunity 
concepts in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 26. See United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 816–18 (10th Cir. 2000) (analyzing the underlying 
facts of Pinkerton, the application of Pinkerton coconspirator liability by lower courts and other circuits, 
and the Tenth Circuit’s own precedent); id. at 818 (“We do agree [with the Eleventh Circuit’s 
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defendant is liable for the actions of that defendant’s coconspirators when those 
actions were (1) intended to further the conspiracy, (2) within the scope of the 
conspiracy, and (3) reasonably foreseeable. 27 Today, the rule established in 
Pinkerton enables the prosecution of organized crime—most commonly gangs 
and drug organizations—because it reduces the degree of culpability necessary 
for a particular defendant to be convicted.28 
In a three-person bank heist, for example, a getaway driver who never 
entered the bank but absconded with the two robbers who did would be liable 
for the substantive offenses of that pair.29 If the two robbers battered a bank 
teller by hitting the teller with their guns, then the driver would also be liable 
for that assault if the assault was reasonably foreseeable and facilitated the 
robbery.30 
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence 
The second foundational block of the Cherry doctrine, developed 
independently of Pinkerton liability,31 is the rule against hearsay. Statements 
made outside of court, if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, are 
hearsay and thus inadmissible into evidence, barring a specific exception.32 A 
statement made outside of court by one defendant to the defendant’s 
coconspirators, therefore, is hearsay.33 But the FRE exclude such statements 
 
reasoning] that Pinkerton’s formulation of conspiratorial liability is an appropriate mechanism for 
assessing whether the actions of another can be imputed to a defendant for purposes of determining 
whether that defendant has waived confrontation and hearsay objections.”). 
 27. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–48 (1946). As noted in the Introduction, supra, 
a court must find by a preponderance of the evidence under FRE 104(a) that enough evidence exists 
for a prosecutor to even argue a Pinkerton liability theory before the jury. 
 28. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.3(a) (3d ed. 2020) (explaining 
that the Pinkerton Court “reconsider[ed]” the degree to which a criminal defendant’s act must “have 
played a part in inducing or aiding the crime”). The LaFave treatise explains that “[c]riminal acts done 
in furtherance of a conspiracy may be sufficiently dependent upon the encouragement and material 
support of the group as a whole to warrant treating each member as a causal agent to each act.” Id. 
However, Pinkerton has received mixed reactions from lower courts and state criminal justice systems 
while the drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected the rule outright. Id. (“Most of the state statutes 
on accomplice liability require more than [the Pinkerton elements.]”). But most importantly for this 
Recent Development, “[t]he rule continues to exist in the federal system.” Id. (citing United States v. 
Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 849–50 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Cherry court also cited United States v. Alvarez, 
755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985), when deciding how to apply Pinkerton. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 817. 
 29. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646–48 (explaining the Pinkerton prongs). 
 30. See id. (explaining the Pinkerton prongs). 
 31. See generally John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 
(1904) (explaining that the rule against hearsay began in English common law in the 1500s). 
 32. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c). The rule defines a “statement” as “a person’s oral assertion, written 
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.” FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
 33. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). For purposes of this Recent Development, it is assumed that the 
statement would be offered in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
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from the hearsay rule, consequently enabling party opponents to admit these 
statements into evidence. 
This category, FRE 801(d)(2) Admissions by a Party Opponent, names 
five instances in which the statement made by a party itself (or someone found 
to be speaking on behalf of the party) may be offered into evidence despite the 
rule against hearsay. 34  This includes FRE 801(d)(2)(E), which permits the 
introduction of an opposing party’s statement into evidence when that 
statement “was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy.”35 
Instead of banning such statements, the Advisory Committee accepts their 
admissibility as a necessary result of our judicial process’s “adversar[ial] 
system.”36 But admission of such statements does not occur without limitations. 
The Committee excepted some statements made by one defendant to their 
coconspirator under 801(d)(2)(E) along Pinkerton’s bounds by allowing only 
those statements made “during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.”37 The Committee contrasted the coconspirator exclusion with the 
FRE 801(d)(2)(d) agent/employee exclusion by arguing that, while the “usual 
test of agency” justifies the agent/employee exclusion,38 the “agency theory of 
conspiracy is at best a fiction” that should not extend “admissibility beyond that 
already established [by Pinkerton coconspirator concepts].”39 
The Committee could have adopted a broad rule generally inclusive of 
statements one coconspirator says to the other without regard to any substantive 
limitation. However, the Committee intentionally adopted Pinkerton’s “in 
furtherance” requirement to protect the rights of defendants.40 This hearsay 
 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 36. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. 
 37. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. The Advisory 
Committee’s note to 801(d)(2)(E) does not explicitly mention the third Pinkerton prong of 
foreseeability. Id. Nevertheless, a court must find by a preponderance of the evidence under FRE 
104(a) that a conspiracy indeed existed between the defendant and their coconspirator for the hearsay 
exception to apply. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note on rules—1997 amendment. 
Because a prosecutor shows this evidence of a conspiracy by proving the Pinkerton prongs, it stands to 
reason by inference that foreseeability must be proven as well. 
 38. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules (“Was the 
admission made by the agent acting in the scope of his employment?”). 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. 
 40. 30B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 6777 (2020 ed. 2020) (“The adoption of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and the rejection of the Model Code 
Uniform Rule approach (which scrapped the [‘in furtherance’] requirement) should be viewed as 
mandating a construction of the ‘in furtherance’ requirement protective of defendants . . . .” (quoting 
United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1978))). 
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exclusion, the coconspirator party opponent rule, therefore mirrors the 
limitations of the Pinkerton rule.41 
Despite the Committee’s effort to distinguish its reasoning behind the 
employer/agent exclusion from that of the coconspirator party opponent 
exclusion, tension exists between the legislative history and case law 
interpreting the latter. The comments of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, for instance, express an intention to extend conspiracy liability only 
in limited circumstances by reading into the coconspirator party opponent rule 
that “a joint venturer is considered . . . a coconspirator for the purposes of this 
rule even though no conspiracy has been charged.” 42  This means that the 
substantive offense (and logical result of the conspiracy)—a robbery for 
example—is all that a prosecutor needs to charge in a case against multiple 
defendants who engaged in a joint criminal act in order for the prosecutor to 
later use the conspirator party opponent rule. The prosecutor need not charge 
“conspiracy” as well. But by that same token, “organized crime membership 
alone does not suffice” to put this hearsay exclusion into play.43 Accordingly, 
the prosecutor instead must show that more than simply a conspiracy itself 
exists and prove that the defendants pursued and acted upon a “specific shared 
criminal task.”44 
C. The Confrontation Clause and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing 
The final Cherry doctrine subcomponent is the Confrontation Clause, 
which intersects with the FBW hearsay exception. Like the party opponent 
hearsay exclusions in FRE 801(d)(2), the FRE also provide for a hearsay 
exception when the witness who would otherwise provide the in-court 
statement is unavailable for trial. 45  The FRE specifically provide that “[a] 
statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in 
wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so 
intending that result” is admissible. 46  Thus, the Committee has explicitly 
accepted the FBW hearsay exception.47 
In contrast to the coconspirator party opponent rule, the rationale 
supporting the FBW hearsay exception originates not from the adversarial 
nature of our criminal justice system, but from the deterrence theory of criminal 
 
 41. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–48 (1946) (discussing the three 
requirements for coconspirator liability). 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) note of the committee on the judiciary, senate report no. 93–
1277 (first citing United States v. Rinaldi, 393 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1968); and then citing United States 
v. Spencer, 415 F.3d 1301, 1304 (7th Cir. 1969)). 
 43. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 44. Id. 
 45. FED. R. EVID. 804. 
 46. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 47. See id. 
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law. The Committee admitted as much by explaining that the FBW hearsay 
exception identifies “the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent 
behavior ‘which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself.’”48 The Cherry 
court similarly reiterated that the FBW hearsay exception ensures that a 
criminal actor does not benefit from their own wrongdoing.49 The deterrence 
theory may also buttress Pinkerton liability: when one defendant engages in a 
behavior that furthers the criminal act of a coconspirator, but where that 
behavior standing alone is not a criminal act, the defendant should still suffer 
the consequences of abetting the coconspirator.50 
However, this is where the Confrontation Clause applies: criminal 
defendants must have the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses in court.51 
The FBW hearsay exception allows an adverse witness’s statement to be entered 
into evidence against the defendant where the defendant wrongfully rendered 
the adverse witness unavailable for trial. 52  A defendant who threatens, 
intimidates, or harms a witness so that the witness cannot or will not testify 
forfeits not only their hearsay objection to that witness’s statement—the FBW 
hearsay exception—but also their right to confront, or cross-examine, that 
witness at trial—the right protected by the Confrontation Clause.53 
The forfeiture of one’s right to confrontation has traditionally meant that 
the defendant forgoes the opportunity to cross-examine that witness.54 While 
the Supreme Court first accepted that doctrine in 1878 in United States v. 
Reynolds, 55  the Court did not elaborate upon or clarify the forfeiture of 
confrontation rights doctrine until Ohio v. Roberts 56 was decided almost one 
hundred years later. Roberts limited the types of statements admissible under 
the forfeiture of confrontation rights doctrine to those with adequate “indicia 
of reliability.”57 This meant that so long as an unavailable witness’s testimony 
proposed to be entered under FRE 804(b)(6) was sufficiently reliable, the 
 
 48. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s note on rules—1997 amendment (quoting 
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 49. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 816 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996)). The Fourth Circuit adopted this reading of the FBW 
hearsay exception as well. United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 50. See LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 13.3(a). 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 52. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 53. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
 54. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (“We have never doubted, therefore, that the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before 
the trier of fact.”); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (“The primary object of the 
[Confrontation Clause] was . . . cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an 
opportunity . . . of compelling [the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may 
look at [the witness], and judge . . . whether [the witness] is worthy of belief.”). 
 55. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 56. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 57. Id. at 66. 
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proponent of that testimony could overcome the defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause rights.58 
In 2004, the Court overturned the indicia of reliability standard in 
Crawford v. Washington, 59 favoring instead a “testimonial” statements test. 60 
While the Court struggles to define the scope of testimonial statements,61 in 
Giles v. California62 the Court limited the instances in which a defendant forfeits 
their confrontation rights to situations in which the particular defendant—not 
just the coconspirator—intended to render the relevant witness unavailable for 
trial.63 Thus, for a defendant to forego both their objection to hearsay and their 
Confrontation Clause right to cross-examination of the statement of an adverse 
witness, the proponent of the statement must prove its “non-testimonial” 
nature.64 
The Cherry court’s holding combined three previously unconnected prongs 
into one doctrine. While Pinkerton established what is today recognized as 
common law conspiracy liability, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 
enacted this common law into statute by drafting the coconspirator party 
opponent rule. Similarly, the Committee’s drafters wrote the FBW hearsay 
exception independent of Pinkerton and the coconspirator party opponent rule 
because this exception, by its language, primarily affects individual actors. The 
Cherry holding collapsed any empty space between these rules by applying 
Pinkerton conspiracy liability to both the coconspirator party opponent rule and 
the FBW hearsay exception. 
 
 58. See id. 
 59. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 60. Id. at 59–61. 
 61. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 58 (2012) (holding that even if a laboratory’s DNA 
report had been introduced into evidence, it was not testimonial because it was produced to find a 
rapist, not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against the defendant); Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico, 561 U.S. 647, 652 (2011) (disallowing the introduction of a laboratory report where the in-
court testimony was not given by the scientist who performed the report); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11 (2009) (describing affidavits as clearly testimonial in nature and 
refusing to make a forensic evidence exception). 
 62. 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 63. Id. at 361 (“[U]nconfronted testimony [will] not be admitted without a showing that the 
defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.”). 
 64. Imagine the following scenario: Jane intentionally renders an adverse witness, Jack, 
unavailable for trial, and Jack’s prior written statement given to police is admitted into evidence 
through FRE 804(b)(6). Before Crawford, to satisfy the dictates of the Confrontation Clause, the 
prosecutor simply had to prove that Jane killed Jack to prevent his testimony at trial. See United States 
v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005). But after Crawford, it could be possible that Jack’s hearsay 
statement still satisfies United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005), when that statement is 
testimonial in nature because Gray does not require a defendant to have had the opportunity to cross-
examine such a testimonial statement in the way that Crawford does. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59–61. 
In such a situation, Jane may have a colorable argument that admission under FRE 804(b)(6) is proper 
but that her Confrontation Clause right to cross-examination still precludes the statement from entering 
evidence. 
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II.  THE TREE TRUNK: CHERRY 
When the Tenth Circuit decided Cherry, it became the highest court to 
decide how Pinkerton liability interacted with the coconspirator party opponent 
rule’s precise language. 65  In Cherry, the federal government charged five 
defendants with drug trafficking crimes based on information provided by an 
informant. 66  Having learned of the informant pretrial, one of the five 
defendants murdered him.67 After the murder, the federal government sought 
to enter the informant’s planned testimony against all five defendants under the 
FBW hearsay exception.68 
On appeal at the Tenth Circuit, the government successfully convinced 
the court that such testimony may be admissible for that purpose. 69  The 
government essentially argued that because the defendants were jointly charged 
for drug trafficking crimes committed through a conspiracy, the testimony of 
the informant who was wrongfully rendered unavailable would have been 
offered against all defendants. 70  The one defendant’s murderous actions, 
therefore, forfeited not only his own hearsay objection but also that of his 
coconspirators.71 But because the same act—the murder of the witness—that 
activates the FBW hearsay exception may also activate the forfeiture of the 
confrontation right, the government supposed that the murderer’s action also 
forfeited his and his coconspirators’ confrontation rights.72 
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the government. The court determined 
that such a theory indeed exists whereby the acts of one conspirator forfeit not 
only the coconspirators’ hearsay objections, but also the coconspirators’ 
Confrontation Clause rights: the agency theory of waiver. 73 Put simply, by 
 
 65. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 816 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We are aware of only one 
published case interpreting the terms ‘engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing’ since the recent 
promulgation of Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(6).”); id. at 818 (“We are unaware of any published opinions 
adopting or rejecting a theory of agency based on Pinkerton liability in the context of the doctrine of 
waiver by misconduct.”). For a discussion of the agency argument, see infra notes 73–86 and 
accompanying text. 
 66. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 813. 
 67. Id. at 814. 
 68. Id. at 813. 
 69. Id. at 816 (“The government urges us to adopt the principles of conspiratorial liability 
enunciated in Pinkerton v. United States, in the context of Rule 804(b)(6) and the Confrontation Clause 
waiver-by-misconduct doctrine.” (citation omitted)); id. at 818 (“Therefore, we conclude that the 
acquiescence prong of Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(6), consistent with the Confrontation Clause, permits 
consideration of a Pinkerton theory of conspiratorial responsibility in determining wrongful 
procurement of witness unavailability . . . .”). 
 70. See id. at 815–16 (understanding the government’s position to be that the conspiracy 
underlying the defendants’ actions rendered the unavailable witness’s testimony admissible). 
 71. See id. at 813. 
 72. Id. at 815–16. 
 73. See id. at 819. While the Tenth Circuit accepted that “[t]he right to confront witnesses is a 
constitutional right personal to the accused,” it nonetheless determined that “there is room for an 
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choosing to engage in a criminal act with a coconspirator, that coconspirator 
becomes the agent of the defendant. To arrive at this conclusion, the Tenth 
Circuit necessarily had to extrapolate from Pinkerton to the FBW hearsay 
exception and then to the forfeiture of Confrontation Clause rights. First, the 
court reasoned that “[i]t would make little sense to limit forfeiture of a 
defendant’s trial rights”—the forfeiture of the 804(b)(6) hearsay objection—“to 
a narrower set of facts than would be sufficient to sustain a conviction . . . .”74 
Therefore, so long as the prosecution satisfies the Pinkerton elements when one 
coconspirator has unlawfully rendered an adverse witness unavailable, the 
hearsay statement is admissible against all defendants. Second, the Cherry court 
found that the word “acquiesce” as used in FRE 804(b)(6) allows for one 
defendant to forfeit the rights of other coconspirators. 75 This “acquiescence 
prong,” therefore, swallows the three Pinkerton prongs. 
Furthermore, the Cherry court collapsed the distinction between the FBW 
hearsay exception and the forfeiture of confrontation rights through its 
interpretation of the word acquiescence as it is used in FRE 804(b)(6).76 In 
particular, the Cherry court read Pinkerton liability into the word acquiesce as 
used in FRE 804(b)(6) by explaining that one who engages in a criminal 
conspiracy acquiesces to the actions that a coconspirator takes on the group’s 
behalf.77 To get to this reading, the Cherry court first found that the phrase 
“engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing” supports the idea that “waiver can be 
imputed under an agency theory of responsibility to a defendant who 
 
agency theory of waiver” when one party is acting on another’s behalf. Id. (citing Olson v. Green, 668 
F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1982)). However, the court noted that liability for the commission of a specific 
intent crime by one defendant could not be imputed to other participants in the conspiracy because of 
the due process limitations inherent to the Pinkerton doctrine. Id. at 818. Specifically, the Cherry court 
reasoned that even though “violence may or may not be [a] foreseeable” consequence of a drug 
conspiracy, that possibility alone is not enough to impute a specific intent crime such as intentional 
homicide from one defendant to all coconspirators. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. at 818–20. 
 76. See Adrienne Rose, Comment, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: Whether a Co-
Conspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right To Confront Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 281, 305–06 (2011); see also United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 964–65 (7th Cir. 
2002) (agreeing with the Cherry dissent that membership in a conspiracy alone should not be sufficient 
to establish waiver). 
 77. See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. This justification for the Cherry doctrine presupposes that a 
criminal actor engaged in a conspiracy intends for their coconspirator(s) to render a witness unavailable 
because both coconspirators benefit from the witness’s absence at trial. But this calls into question the 
Cherry court’s assumption that forfeiture by wrongdoing and waiver by wrongdoing are equivalent 
phrases. For a criminal actor to waive a constitutional right, they must know that the right exists. See 
Nathaniel Koslof, Cherry Still on Top: How Pinkerton Concepts Continue To Govern Coconspirator 
Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles, 55 B.C. L. REV. 301, 327 (2014). But for a criminal actor to 
forfeit a constitutional right, knowledge of the right’s existence is irrelevant. See id. Thus, intent on the 
part of the criminal actor is not relevant to the Cherry court’s analysis even though that court premises 
its new doctrine on that assumption. 
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‘acquiesced’ in the wrongful procurement of a witness’s unavailability but did 
not actually ‘engage[ ]’ in wrongdoing apart from the conspiracy itself.”78 The 
Cherry court then incorporated the “in furtherance” and “within the scope” 
elements of Pinkerton into that definition.79 
But the Cherry doctrine presumes an agency theory of conspiracy as 
prescribed by Pinkerton.80 While Pinkerton enables prosecutors—by an agency 
theory—to charge one defendant with the substantive criminal offenses 
committed by coconspirators, the Advisory Committee explicitly rejected 
agency as a justification for the coconspirator hearsay objection.81 Although 
agency theory is sufficient to charge a defendant with the crimes of a 
coconspirator (provided that the Pinkerton prongs are satisfied), a court may not 
deprive the defendant of constitutionally protected liberty without a verdict 
determined by a fair trial.82 Therefore, the agency theory alone in that context 
does not deprive a defendant of any constitutional right. 
The Cherry court thus borrowed and incorporated Pinkerton liability by 
reading the forfeiture doctrine under an agency theory of waiver.83 Because the 
waiver theory presumes the ability of the criminal actor to engage in the 
conspiracy willingly and freely, the Cherry court found that Pinkerton 
coconspirator liability would appropriately protect a defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause rights but also prevent a defendant from benefiting from their wrongful 
action.84 The Cherry doctrine thus attempts to balance constitutional and law 
enforcement interests. 
 
 78. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 816 (citing FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)). 
 79. Id. at 820. On the other hand, United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2002), added 
Pinkerton’s third “reasonably foreseeable” prong to limit Cherry’s applicability to only those defendants 
that “actually acquiesced either explicitly or implicitly to the misconduct.” Id. at 965. 
 80. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 819 (“[T]here is room for an agency theory of waiver . . . . [where] agency 
is inferred if an act is within the scope of the conspiracy, thereby resulting in the co-conspirator’s 
individual liability under the substantive criminal law.” (citing Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421, 429 (8th 
Cir. 1982))). 
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41. 
 82. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 83. See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 818. 
 84. See id. at 820. By incorporating Pinkerton coconspirator liability principles, the Cherry doctrine 
assumes (quite rightly, in most cases) that individuals who engage in conspiratorial criminal activity do 
so in order to commit some type of criminal act. The Tenth Circuit created the Cherry doctrine by 
analyzing the holdings of cases from three different circuits: United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 
(2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir. 1996); and United States v. White, 116 
F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Cherry, 217 F.3d at 819. While the Second Circuit found that “[b]are 
knowledge of a plot to kill [the witness] and a failure to give warning to appropriate authorities is 
sufficient to constitute a waiver,” the First Circuit would have limited that holding by requiring “an 
affirmative act by the particular defendant” before imputing waiver. Id. (first quoting Mastrangelo, 693 
F.2d at 273–74; and then citing Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280). The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, found 
that “mere participation” in a conspiracy is “insufficient to constitute a waiver of a defendant’s 
constitutional confrontation rights.” Id. at 820 (quoting United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618, 623 
(D.D.C. 1993), aff’d, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). In the Cherry court’s view, the Second Circuit’s 
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While the court read this agency theory of conspiracy liability into the 
FBW hearsay exception through the term acquiescence, it also used that 
acquiescence prong to read an agency theory of conspirator liability into the 
Confrontation Clause.85 The Cherry court accordingly applied agency to both 
the forfeiture of the hearsay objection and the Confrontation Clause. Under the 
Cherry doctrine, therefore, the actions of a defendant’s coconspirator deprive 
that defendant of a constitutional right. But this unjustifiably combined what 
the Supreme Court has held are two separate inquiries: (a) whether a 
defendant’s engagement in a conspiracy has forfeited their hearsay objection, 
and (b) whether that same behavior by the defendant has forfeited their 
Confrontation Clause right.86 
Following Cherry, the Supreme Court has developed a jurisprudence 
detailing how the FBW hearsay exception intersects with the Confrontation 
Clause.87 One of those cases, Giles, seemed at first to overrule Cherry.88 This was 
because the Court in Giles required a prosecutor to prove that a defendant 
intended to render a witness unavailable for trial.89 The Tenth Circuit in Cherry, 
on the other hand, only required that the defendant’s coconspirator possess that 
particular intent.90 Under Cherry, therefore, the prosecutor need only show that 
a defendant themself engaged in a conspiracy and that it was a goal or an act in 
furtherance of that conspiracy to render an adverse witness unavailable for 
trial. 91  However, as shown in the following discussion of United States v. 
Dinkins 92 —a Fourth Circuit decision in a Cherry-doctrine case—Giles only 
limited Cherry’s scope. 
III.  THE CHERRY TREE GROWS: FROM DINKINS TO ADOMA 
Following the Tenth Circuit’s creation of the Cherry doctrine, several 
other circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, have adopted its reasoning. The 
D.C. Circuit adopted the Cherry doctrine in 2006,93 and the Fourth Circuit 
considered the issue for the second time in 2012 when it heard Dinkins. 94 
However, the Fourth Circuit decided Dinkins post-Giles in a jurisprudential 
 
rule was too broad and the First Circuit’s and the D.C. Circuit’s rules were too narrow. See id. 
(“[I]nvolvement in a conspiracy may not be sufficient, standing alone, to waive confrontation rights, 
[but] the White analysis is incomplete.”). 
 85. Rose, supra note 76, at 301–02. 
 86. See id. at 301–02, 302 n.103 (first quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); 
and then quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008)). 
 87. See infra Part IV. 
 88. See Giles v. California, 544 U.S. 353, 361 (2008). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 821 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 91. Id. 
 92. 691 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 93. United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 364 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 94. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 384–85. 
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context in which it seemed that the Supreme Court had effectively overturned 
Cherry.95 Nonetheless, Dinkins upheld Cherry and provided the Fourth Circuit a 
launching pad from which to expand the Cherry doctrine. 
Like Cherry, Dinkins concerned a conspiratorial drug trafficking operation 
involving multiple defendants.96 But where Cherry involved a small-scale drug 
trafficking operation among five defendants, the organization in Dinkins was a 
formal drug gang with a defined hierarchy, territory, and purpose.97 When a 
member of the gang became a government informant, the named Dinkins 
defendant sought to murder the informant to render him unavailable for trial.98 
Like the Cherry court, the Dinkins court admitted the unavailable witness’s 
hearsay statements pursuant to the FBW hearsay exception.99 
The Dinkins court, like the Cherry court, found that “traditional principles 
of conspiracy liability are applicable within the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
analysis.”100 The Fourth Circuit found that the term acquiesce as used in FRE 
804(b)(6) implies conspiracy liability because it includes “wrongdoing that . . . 
is . . . attributable to [the] defendant because he accepted or tacitly approved 
the wrongdoing.”101 Again, like the Cherry court, the Dinkins court argued that 
an agency theory of waiver connected Pinkerton coconspirator liability to the 
forfeiture doctrine.102 The Fourth Circuit went one step further, however, when 
it found that the “application of Pinkerton liability standards” should be 
“coextensive with the scope of forfeiture by wrongdoing.”103 
This reasoning enabled the Fourth Circuit to extend the Cherry doctrine 
yet again in Adoma. In Adoma, the Fourth Circuit became the first court to 
incorporate RICO charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1) and 1962(d) into the 
FBW hearsay exception and the forfeiture of confrontation rights framework.104 
Although RICO premises criminal liability on an affiliation theory, whereby a 
defendant exposes themself to liability simply by interacting with their 
 
 95. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008). Because Giles requires a prosecutor to prove 
that a defendant intended to render the witness unavailable for trial, it seemed that Cherry was overruled. 
See supra Part II. 
 96. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 362–63. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. at 364. 
 99. Id. at 384. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. (citing United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 964 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 102. See id. (“The principle underlying the Pinkerton doctrine is that ‘conspirators are each other’s 
agents; and a principal is bound by the acts of his agents within the scope of the agency.’” (quoting 
United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1379 (4th Cir. 1996))). The Fourth Circuit gave particular 
weight to the Cherry court’s approach to balancing the rights of a criminal defendant with law 
enforcement’s need to prevent a criminal defendant from benefiting from their own wrongdoing. See 
id. at 384–85. 
 103. Id. at 385. The Dinkins decision was issued four years after Giles, upon which the Dinkins court 
based this coextensiveness argument. See id. 
 104. See United States v. Adoma, 781 F. App’x 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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coconspirator(s), it is unclear whether Pinkerton liability is proven by virtue of 
RICO conspiracy liability or whether these are two distinct doctrines where the 
latter is a broader category including within itself the former. 105 But as the 
borrowing argument supposes,106 it should come as no surprise that Pinkerton 
and RICO conspiracy concepts would merge when combined with evidentiary 
law. 
Satisfaction of the elements of a RICO conspiracy, however, does not 
satisfy the elements of a Pinkerton conspiracy. Instead, a RICO conspiracy 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 only requires that a group of criminal actors endeavor 
to further a criminal enterprise, “even if the conspirator does not commit a 
predicate act.”107 While a Pinkerton conspiracy requires a defendant to commit 
the predicate criminal offense of entering a “criminal affiliation” through which 
the defendant is liable for the actions of their coconspirator, a RICO conspiracy 
imposes liability for an inchoate offense 108  alone. 109  As compared with a 
Pinkerton conspiracy, a RICO conspiracy imposes liability on a much broader 
range of actions not foreseen by the Advisory Committee.110 For example, one 
prong of the Pinkerton doctrine requires a coconspirator to have acted in 
furtherance of the overall conspiracy; under RICO, the prosecutor need only 
show that the coconspirator “have possessed knowledge of only the general 
contours of the conspiracy.” 111  Therefore, “a defendant not guilty of the 
substantive offense may still be convicted of conspiracy if there is proof of an 
agreement to commit the substantive crime.” 112 As a result, the opinion in 
 
 105. See Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to 
RICO Actions, 56 MO. L. REV. 931, 956–57 (1991) (noting that while “American law is loath to predicate 
criminal liability upon ‘affiliation,’” doing so adequately combats the underlying concern of “aligning 
with another or others to achieve some unlawful purpose”); id. at 956 n.132 (“A person may be found 
to be ‘affiliated’ with an organization . . . when there is . . . a close working alliance or association 
between him and the organization . . . .” (quoting Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 69 n.7 
(1969))). Some criminal court proceedings have identified Pinkerton liability as overlapping with 
RICO, and civil court proceedings have done so as well. See Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A New 
Due Process Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 123–24, 123 n.183 (2006). 
 106. For an explanation of borrowing and convergence theory, see infra Part IV. 
 107. CGC Holding Co. v. Broad & Cassel, 773 F.3d 1076, 1088 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 108. An “inchoate offense” is “[a] step toward the commission of another crime, the step in itself 
being serious enough to merit punishment.” Inchoate Offense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019). 
 109. See Brenner, supra note 105, at 965–66, 974 & n.187. 
 110. Id. at 965 (“Federal law recognizes six varieties of affiliative liability: (a) aiding and abetting 
commission of a substantive offense; (b) attempting to aid and abet commission of a substantive 
offense; (c) aiding and abetting an attempt to commit a substantive offense; (d) conspiring to commit 
a substantive offense; (e) conspiring to aid and abet the commission of a substantive offense; and (f) 
Pinkerton liability [though not as part of RICO].”). 
 111. United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 100 (2d Cir. 2000); see Dean Browning Webb, 
Judicially Fusing the Pinkerton Doctrine to RICO Conspiracy Litigation Through the Concept of Mediate 
Causation, 97 KY. L.J. 665, 665 n.4 (2008). 
 112. Webb, supra note 111, at 666 n.4. 
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Adoma distorts the reasoning of the Advisory Committee regarding the 
coconspirator exclusion and unjustifiably conflates Pinkerton coconspirator 
liability with RICO liability. The borrowing and convergence doctrine, 
however, explains this extension. 
IV.  THE TREE OR THE FOREST? DOCTRINAL BORROWING AND 
CONVERGENCE 
As a preliminary matter, the codification of the common law coconspirator 
hearsay exclusion in the FRE finalized the incorporation, or borrowing, of the 
Pinkerton conspirator prongs into evidence law. 113  According to Professor 
Laurin’s reading of the work of Professors Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai, 
“borrowing” is “a strategy of doctrinal persuasion and transformation that 
‘draws on one domain of . . . knowledge in order to interpret, bolster, or 
otherwise illuminate another domain.’”114 While the latter professors analyze 
borrowing as a constitutional lawmaking strategy, borrowing occurs in the 
public as well as private legal domain, both within and outside of constitutional 
law. 115 As a consequence—or logical endpoint—of borrowing, the analytical 
framework by which judges (or other legal policy and lawmakers) include 
concepts of one legal discipline into another facilitates the convergence of 
previously distinct legal fields.116 
Once one legal doctrine enters the sphere of another through borrowing, 
that process “tend[s] to generate a cascade of pressure on doctrinal barriers, 
prompting courts to engage in further blurring of the boundaries between 
previously distinct legal arenas and to gradually move the target doctrine toward 
a point of convergence with the source.” 117  This “‘hydraulic’ property” of 
borrowing ensures that the one legal doctrine imported into the second exerts a 
formative pressure such that both doctrines eventually coalesce. 118 
Convergence, therefore, is a necessary and expected feature initiated by 
borrowing, which itself provides judges and policy makers with an effective 
analytical and rhetorical tool capable of reshaping the law. 
However, the ultimate end of borrowing—convergence—does not 
consistently lead to a more coherent legal theory. That dissonance is present in 
Adoma. Although evidentiary law itself is not constitutional, the rules of 
evidence (both federal and common law) implicate constitutional values, 
particularly in criminal cases, because these rules subject the defendant to a 
 
 113. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 462–
63 (2010) (defining “borrowing” in the constitutional law context). 
 114. See Laurin, supra note 25, at 672 (quoting Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 113, at 463). 
 115. See id. at 741–42 (citing borrowing in copyright and trademark law). 
 116. Laurin, supra note 25, at 710. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. 
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potential deprivation of liberty.119 Accordingly, evidence law is also bound with 
criminal law and has incorporated principles of criminal law within the rules 
themselves. For instance, the coconspirator party opponent rule explicitly 
adopts the criminal law concept of conspiracy liability.120 Both the FRE and the 
common law recognize that the “responsibility of the party” in making the self-
inculpating statement to their coconspirator warrants that statement’s 
admissibility into evidence.121 
Nonetheless, the forfeiture of confrontation rights explicitly implicates 
constitutional considerations separate from evidentiary concerns.122 While FRE 
804(b)(6) provides the hearsay exception to the forfeiture doctrine, Crawford, 
Giles, and their progeny explicate the forfeiture doctrine’s Confrontation Clause 
considerations.123 Although commentators at the time of Giles expected that 
opinion to “effectively overrule[] . . . Cherry,”124 that has not been the case.125 
Instead, Adoma shows that the Fourth Circuit is willing to expand Cherry’s 
holding from applying Pinkerton coconspirator liability in the Confrontation 
Clause forfeiture by wrongdoing context to include RICO enterprise liability. 
Convergence nonetheless explains how the Adoma court reached its flawed 
decision. First, the coconspirator party opponent rule created a hearsay 
exception premised upon Pinkerton coconspirator liability.126 This underscores 
that a defendant is responsible for making self-inculpating statements to their 
coconspirators because of the defendant’s inherent agency in making such a 
statement. 127  This enabled the Cherry court to apply an agency theory of 
conspiracy to the FBW hearsay exception: the court must hold a defendant 
responsible for engaging in a conspiracy that rendered the witness unavailable 
because of the inherent agency in joining that conspiracy.128 But of course, the 
 
 119. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 101 CORNELL L. 
REV. 57, 58–60 (2015) (explaining the extent to which courts choose to uphold constitutional values 
and disregard evidentiary rules when the latter conflict with the former); Alex Stein, Constitutional 
Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 91–92 (2008) (arguing for the “constitutionalizing” of evidence 
law to provide better procedural safeguards at trial). 
 120. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note on rules—1997 amendment (discussing 
statements by coconspirators). 
 121. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules (“[T]he responsibility 
of a party is considered sufficient to justify reception [of the statement] in evidence against him . . . .”). 
But, as noted, see supra Part III, the concept of “conspiracy” under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) is not limited to 
criminal law because only a joint endeavor united by a common interest attaches liability for the hearsay 
exclusion. 
 122. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“[W]e do not think the Framers meant 
to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence . . . .”). 
 123. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. 
 124. Rose, supra note 76, at 318. 
 125. United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 383 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Giles decision did not 
materially alter application of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception . . . .”). 
 126. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. 
 127. See id. 
 128. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 819–20 (10th Cir. 2000); see supra Part II. 
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scope of that liability was limited by the three Pinkerton prongs: in furtherance, 
within the scope, and foreseeability.129 
Since the enactment of RICO, a federal conspiracy common law has 
developed in parallel to that of Pinkerton conspiracies. 130  But the broad, 
overarching scope of RICO conspiracy liability dwarfs the scope of Pinkerton 
conspiracy liability because RICO typically applies regardless of Pinkerton’s 
scope requirement.131 In particular, a defendant under RICO may be liable for 
the acts of a coconspirator even without proof of the scope, foreseeability, and 
in furtherance prongs of Pinkerton.132 Moreover, substantive conspiracy or other 
charges apply under RICO regardless of a defendant’s “commission of a 
substantive offense.”133 When a prosecutor brings a case hinged on Pinkerton 
liability, they may either charge the defendant with conspiracy itself as a 
substantive offense or simply charge the defendant with the crimes committed 
by their coconspirator(s); but in either case, the prosecutor must prove the three 
Pinkerton elements. 134  Otherwise, affiliative liability does not attach under 
Pinkerton.135 Therefore, the convergence of federal RICO conspiracy principles 
with those of the common law Pinkerton prongs expanded the nature by which 
a court may find a defendant to have waived their hearsay objection under FRE 
804(b)(6) and, consequently, their confrontation right. 
The convergence of Pinkerton with RICO conspiracy liability as 
exemplified by Adoma also illustrates how borrowing can reduce procedural 
protections for defendants because Adoma enables a prosecutor to use the FBW 
hearsay exception by proving a conditional fact under FRE 104(b) (“the 
conditional fact rule”). In the context of the Cherry doctrine, this necessitates 
discussion of FRE 104(b) and the prosecutor’s burden of proof.136 First, FRE 
104(b) requires a prosecutor to prove the relevance of a conditional fact—or a 
fact the existence of which necessarily depends on proof of some other fact—
only by a preponderance of the evidence.137 When that conditional fact then 
enables the prosecutor to use another evidentiary rule that depends on the proof 
 
 129. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. 
 130. See Webb, supra note 111, at 669–80 (discussing Supreme Court cases interpreting the RICO 
statute). 
 131. See Brenner, supra note 105, at 960–70. 
 132. See Webb, supra note 111, at 665 n.4. 
 133. Brenner, supra note 105, at 966. 
 134. This is because FRE 104(a) first allows a prosecutor to show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that a defendant engaged in a conspiracy under Pinkerton. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Having 
proven the conspiracy, the prosecutor may then show that that the defendant is guilty of the crimes of 
their coconspirators by virtue of the conspiracy. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Because 
prosecutors have discretion regarding what charges to bring in a given case, this theoretical prosecutor 
then may choose whether to charge criminal conspiracy. 
 135. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra Introduction. 
 137. FED. R. EVID. 104(b); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987). 
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of that conditional fact, this means that the subsequent use of the second rule is 
possible through proof based on a preponderance standard.138 In the context of 
the Cherry doctrine, therefore, this means that a prosecutor need only prove a 
Pinkerton conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence before gaining access 
to the hearsay and Confrontation Clause waivers. 
The Fourth Circuit in Adoma then further expanded this logical chain by 
applying the conditional fact rule to a RICO conspiracy.139 As noted, a RICO 
conspiracy (unlike a Pinkerton conspiracy) does not require that the defendant 
commit a substantive offense or act in furtherance of the conspiratorial goals.140 
Therefore, proving a RICO conspiracy for purposes of the conditional fact 
rule—with the ultimate goal of using FRE 804(b)(6) or arguing forfeiture of a 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights—is even less protective of a 
defendant’s rights than proving a typical Pinkerton conspiracy for purposes of 
FRE 104(b). The Adoma court failed to account for this expansion of the 
forfeiture doctrine when that court did not adequately determine the correct 
standard by which to find the forfeiture of the defendants’ Confrontation 
Clause rights. Although the majority rule in both federal and state court 
proceedings determines whether the Pinkerton prongs are satisfied by a 
preponderance of the evidence according to FRE 104(a), the minority—and 
more appropriate—rule applies the clear and convincing evidence standard.141 
While the preponderance standard is appropriate for determining whether the 
defendant has forfeited their hearsay objection under FRE 804(b)(6), that same 
standard is insufficient to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
Because the right to confrontation is a constitutional guarantee and 
“forfeiture of constitutional rights is generally disfavored,” a more equitable 
standard would “resolve close cases in the defendant’s favor.”142 This equitable 
standard is that of clear and convincing proof, which a court would still evaluate 
under FRE 104(b). Only by clear and convincing proof should a court find that 
a defendant has engaged in a conspiracy through which the actions of a 
coconspirator forfeited the confrontation rights of the defendant. The clear and 
 
 138. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b). For example, assume that a plaintiff wishes to enter a hearsay 
statement for the truth allegedly made by a defendant. That statement is typically admissible under 
FRE 801(d)(2)(A) as an “opposing party’s statement.” See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). But suppose 
that there is a legitimate factual question as to whether a defendant truly made that statement (such as 
some evidence tending to show a third person made that statement). Under FRE 104(b), the plaintiff 
need only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did in fact make that 
statement in order to then invoke FRE 801(d)(2)(A). See FED. R. EVID. 104(b). 
 139. See United States v. Adoma, 781 F. App’x 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 140. Brenner, supra note 105, at 960–70; Webb, supra note 111, at 665 n.4. 
 141. See Aaron R. Petty, Proving Forfeiture and Bootstrapping Testimony After Crawford, 43 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 593, 601–02 (2007). 
 142. Id. at 609. 
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convincing proof standard should apply only to the Cherry doctrine when the 
forfeiture concerns a defendant’s confrontation rights. 
When the question is whether a defendant engaged in a conspiracy for 
purposes of FRE 801(d)(2)(E)—which governs whether a party opponent’s 
hearsay statements may be admitted—the court should continue to apply the 
preponderance standard. This is appropriate in that context because no 
constitutional right is at stake in the context of the coconspirator party 
opponent rule.143 Furthermore, an underlying RICO charge should only lead to 
the forfeiture of a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights by the Cherry 
doctrine when the RICO conspiracy also satisfies the Pinkerton prongs. This is 
because the scope of RICO conspiracy liability is well beyond that of Pinkerton. 
Accordingly, the Adoma Court unjustifiably expanded the Cherry doctrine to 
forfeit a defendant’s confrontation rights in the RICO context. 
CONCLUSION 
The Confrontation Clause demonstrates that the framers envisioned a 
criminal justice system that is both fair and adversarial. While the 
Confrontation Clause requires that criminal defendants have the ability to 
confront the adverse witnesses against them, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
found that a criminal defendant may forfeit that right when they wrongfully 
render such a witness unavailable for trial.144 On the one hand, this preserves 
the fairness of our criminal justice process by ensuring that such a defendant 
does not benefit from their wrongful acts; on the other hand, this preserves the 
adversarial nature of that process by admitting otherwise inadmissible 
testimony. This forfeiture of confrontation rights by wrongdoing, therefore, 
arguably serves legitimate governmental interests by preventing harms such as 
witness tampering and murder. 
But when a criminal defendant themself wrongfully renders a witness 
unavailable for trial, they willingly choose to forfeit their own confrontation 
right. That same logic applies to a Pinkerton conspiracy: a criminal defendant 
who willingly entered into a criminal conspiracy deserves the punishment 
garnered by the acts of the defendant’s coconspirators so long as the Pinkerton 
prongs are satisfied. The fairness of our criminal justice system then enables a 
prosecutor to argue under the Cherry doctrine that a coconspirator’s pretrial 
murder of an adverse witness has forfeited not only the coconspirator’s 
confrontation rights but also those of the defendant who did not participate in 
the murder. 
 
 143. No constitutional right is at stake because the rule against hearsay itself is not constitutionally 
created. See FED. R. EVID. 802. The only reason that the coconspirator party opponent rule may 
involve constitutional concerns is to the extent that the rule allows admission into evidence of a 
statement that would violate the Confrontation Clause. 
 144. See supra Section I.C. 
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Removing the evidentiary and constitutional safeguards guaranteed to a 
criminal defendant because of the actions of the defendant’s coconspirators as 
defined by RICO, however, does not enhance the fairness of our criminal justice 
system. Indeed, doing so detracts from that fairness. Whereas Pinkerton liability 
requires the affirmative act of a defendant entering into a criminal conspiracy, 
RICO conspirator liability attaches for inchoate offenses. Furthermore, such 
RICO liability does not require a coconspirator’s criminal act to have been in 
furtherance of the original conspiracy or to have been reasonably foreseeable to 
the other defendants. Therefore, Adoma impermissibly extended the Cherry 
doctrine beyond its Pinkerton bounds. 
Only one remedy would maintain Cherry’s validity, as the Supreme Court 
seems to desire. First, the Fourth Circuit should renounce its decision and other 
circuits should refuse to adopt Adoma’s reasoning. 145  Second, courts should 
adopt a clear and convincing evidentiary standard in Cherry doctrine cases. This 
means that when holding the FRE 104(a) hearing, a prosecutor must prove to 
the judge by a clear and convincing standard, and not by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that a Pinkerton conspiracy existed. Only then may a prosecutor argue 
that a coconspirator’s wrongful actions against an adverse witness forfeited the 
confrontation rights of all coconspirators. This more accurately ensures that our 
criminal justice system remains both fair and adversarial. 
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